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
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3	SCOULCE: Cospects for Overthrowing Sactro from Within % 55	
Ø.	This paper examines cracks within the Castro regime and how the Uni	
4	To letes might exploit them. It is based on the assumption that, except f	
(2)	minvasion, the only effective move to throw out Castro must come from with a library itself. It further assumes that a Caban must revolt is unlikely, and the	
100	E Stherefore the only force capable of expelling Castro lies within the regime.	
2	See Stro See Strong	
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	old Committee Party members and the "new communist" fidelishes are	
•	subdivided informal groupings that vary in their degree of commitment to the Leviet Union. Ranked from Lost to least committed, five groups can be	
	subdivided informal groupings that vary in their degree of commitment to the Lovict Union. Ranked from Lost to least committed, five groups can be singled out:	
STATE	singled out: 1) Moscow-oriented veteran Co unists, probably including Plus Roca and	
T C	T () Dezero rena es well as Anibel Escalente;	
	W H = 2) Pro-fidelist: veteran Communists: those who owe greater alleging to	
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DEP	3) Communist Fidelistas: Raul and the Guevara, for example;	
	:/> Fro-Communist Fidelistas: persons, not trained Communists, who ind	
	Communism very attractive and useful. Fidel is No. 1 in this group.	
	j) Leftist nationalists owing strong allegiance to Fidel who are "Communicated and additional and additional and additional and additional additional and additional addition	. 11
	by circumstance rather than by condiction.	
	In the past year two lines of exwage within this heterogeneous grouping	
	have been observed: one that server was the trained, Moscow-oriented Communists (group 1) from the others, and one that separates the "leftist nationalist"	
	fide issues (group 5) from those more heavily tainted with Consultant. The group at the two extremes have, with Fidel's mediation, been able to get along. Fidel	
	halted the old Communists' program for enining control of all responsible	
	positions in the regime's structure in a rly 1962, but he has not driver the	
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old Communists out. The leftist-nationalist fidelists still have grounds for resentment.

Given time and continued Soviet protection, odds are that the center groupings can forge a smoothly working coalition which will create a more monolithic regime by filling the government apparatus with the rising generation of recruits to communism.

The Leftist Nationalists in the Legime

The leftist nationalists in the regime constitute the only source for a coup and a break with the Soviet Union. They have less and less of a role in the new Cuba as long as it continues on its present course, and many of them have arms at hand.

We lack specific intelligence for a comprehensive picture of the names, numbers and power roles of regime supporters who dislike the Communist takeover of Caba, but there are many indicators that displeasure exists. Numerous reports during 1962 rate displeasure in lower regime levels as widespread. Only in the Army is there much evidence of resortment at higher levels of authority. Lieutenants, captains and even majors (top rank in Caba) have on occasion been reported as dissidents.

Resentment among the Army officers results from a three-way squeeze:

1) the old Communist thrust for control over the military; 2) deviat telecover of critical military functions; 3) threat of displacement by indoctrinated young Communists. This unrest led internal resistance groups plotting a revolt during the summer to hope they might be joined by a large percentage of the Army.

However, in the four-year history of the regime, no coup plot has reached in livenced stage. Besides being deterred by the secret police and informer network, positive loyalty has kept leftist nationalists in the Army within the regime. Ferhaps more than other groups, the military leaders — old Sterra kaestra men — owe personal loyalty to Fidel Castro, who put them where they are now. While he is the communizer of Cuba, he, oddly enough, still represents their bulwark against inundation by "the Communists", as he showed by checking the old Communist drive in early 1962. Trusting in him, they have accepted with a certain amount of difficulty the wisdom of his alignment with the USER and, more easily, his hostility toward the US. So long as these feelings were fixed, action from this group has been unimaginable.

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Frying the Way for a Coun

Underpinning all elements in the regime has been confidence in Devict power and will to protect Cuba, a belief steadily increasing since early 1960. The UDSR's unilateral decision to withdraw its strategic missiles in the face of US pressure seriously shock that confidence. In the still fluid situation created by the missile crisis, those least counitted to the Communist course of the Revolution might be brought to reject alignant with the Deviet Union as well as rejecting Castro and regime leaders should they continue to favor this alignment.


Implications for US Policy


If the above analysis of the situation is correct, it might be possible for the US to premote resistance within the regime and eventually coupaction by moves along the following lines:

- 1) Creating an attractive alternative. Leftist nationalist action would depend upon the creation of an appealing alternative to the Soviet alliance and to support for Fidel. At present the leftist nationalists see no place for themselves in a post-Castro Cuba, which they feel either would be recaptured by the US for the exiles or dependent on the Soviet Union in the face of continued US hostility. The US would have to:
 - L) convince them they could take charge of the Revolution after Sastro;
 - b) assume them that in exchange for breaking their dependent ties with the Soviets and reestablishing a national Revolution they would get immediate normalization of relations with the West -- perhaps through an OAS pledge.
- encouraging resistance would be the outcome of US-Soviet negotiations. The more the outcome weakens Cuban confidence in Soviet protection, the greater will be the effect in stimulating anti-Castro action within the regime. (See RSB 165, "Regotiations on Cuba: the Edvantages of Stalemate," for a discussion of the implications of a failure to reach agreement on Cuba.)

US moves which lend themselves to being interpreted as concessions (e.g. cessation of overflights) extracted by Soviet negotiators would tend to confirm the "wisdom" of Cuba's present policies. On the other hand, certain military threats — such as threat of invasion or octual exile raids — would tend to draw regime supporters together, as they are still committed to the defense of Luba against foreigners or "counter-revolutionaries."

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- challen in recent weeks because of his identification with the missile episode. His a labour insistence on the "fire points" is an effort to recover lost ground, and it opens him to a further betweek as these are ignored or floated by such US actions as the following:
 - :) stepping up economic pressures through shipping blacklist and denial of markets;
 - b) strengthening Guantanamo forces; and
 - c) nobilizing additional OAS units in naval patrol operations.

ry weakening of Cuban confidence in Soviet support would contribute to reducing with in Fidel. An OAS grantate of normalized relations once Castro that would not a price on his head, help to isolate him, and build him up for the role of scapegoat.

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